Political parties are indispensable for democratic consolidation. In turn, a stable and effective party system depends on consistent and enduring support from social groups. Using the LipsetRokkan paradigm as a point of departure, this article tests the relationship between social structure and party support in six Asian democracies-Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and Taiwan-using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems dataset. The results show that, outside of the two Australasian countries, the four Lipset-Rokkan social cleavages are only loosely related to party support, mainly through center-periphery and urbanrural divisions. The absence of an owner-worker cleavage is explained by the suppression of labor-based parties in several of the countries. More generally, the results suggest the importance of the socializing experiences associated with the democratic transitions in the each of the four newer democracies.
Data and Measurement
To examine social cleavages and voting we use data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems module 2. The analyses are restricted to voters in national elections in each of the six countries.
x To measure the effect of social structure on vote, multinomial logistic regression (MNL) is used. MNL is appropriate where a dependent variable has more than two categories, and enables a more complex statistical model to be estimated; it is especially valuable when analysing voting in a multiparty system. xi In the analyses of the Philippines survey, logistic regression rather than MNL is used to measure the presidential vote, since the dependent variable is dichotomous.
Lipset and Rokkan identified center-periphery as the first basis for the political divisions that emerged in European party systems at the beginning of the twentieth century. This reflects the antagonism of those living in peripheral regions towards the political authority of the center.
Center-periphery antagonisms have periodically played a major role in twentieth century East Asia. xii We measure center-periphery by the distance between the capital city in each country and the region or province that the voter lives in. Because the absolute distances vary widely, they have been standardized on a zero to 10 scale, 10 representing the region or province most distant from the national capital, zero the national capital itself. Center-periphery differences are greatest in the Philippines, reflecting the large proportion of voters living in Visayas and Mindanao, the two island groups most remote from the National Capital Region. The differences are smallest in Australia and New Zealand, and in Korea, in the latter case partly because of the state's strong policy of decentralization that began in the early 1980s.
xiii State-church divisions based on religion are a main arena of political conflict in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe. The analyses presented here rely on church attendance and religious denomination. Church attendance is measured by a six point scale, ranging from never attends to attends once a week or more; not surprisingly given the predominance of Catholicism, the Philippines has the highest incidence of church attendance across the six countries.
Measuring religious denomination is more complex because of the diversity of religions across the six countries. Buddhist and other religions contrasted with those with no religion. In Taiwan, the main religions have been Buddhism and Taoism, and they are included with other religions contrasted with those with no religion. xvi Catholicism has dominated the Philippines since the sixteenth century, and since only two respondents reported not having a religion, the reference category is those who said they had a religious denomination other than Catholicism.
[ Table 1 about here]
Social divisions over industrialization can also give rise to an urban-rural cleavage.
Although it ceased to be politically important in many countries after industrialization (and in any event was often absorbed by religion), the urban-rural cleavage has remained electorally important in some countries through the presence of agrarian parties. Urban-rural differences are measured by a four-point scale derived from the area of residence measure included in the various surveys. The most rural country in Table 1 is the Philippines, where 66 percent reported living in a rural area; the most urban is New Zealand, where 64 percent reported living in a city, followed by Australia (53 percent) and Japan (44 percent). Urbanization is also strongly associated with center-periphery relations in the Philippines, but only modestly so in Japan and
Taiwan. There is no association in Australia, Korea or New Zealand.
xvii
The fourth cleavage is the division between owners and workers, reflected in occupation.
Two direct measures of occupation are used here: non-manual workers and farmers, with manual workers and those not in the labor force forming the reference category. Since unemployment is often a major source of political conflict, that is also included. The countries vary considerably in their occupational structure, reflecting in part their differing levels of economic development.
As we would expect, Australia has the highest number of white collar workers (56 percent), followed by New Zealand (46 percent) and Japan (44 percent); the much less industrialized
Philippines has the lowest (9 percent) and has three in 10 of its voters are also employed in agriculture. Unemployment, at least at the time the surveys were conducted, was highest in Japan and lowest in Australia.
In Western democracies, parties of the left emerged from trade union roots, and union membership has been a major predictor of the vote ever since. However, the decline in union membership since the 1980s across most industrialized societies xviii has diminished the political importance of unions, while the proliferation of professional and business associations has blurred its political salience. Union membership in Australia and New Zealand has been of major political importance; across the other four countries membership is modest-10 percent or less- 
Measuring the Vote
In each of the four countries, vote is measured as the vote for the major parties in the lower house parliamentary elections, with the exception of Japan where the vote is for the upper house.
The distribution of voters in the surveys is shown in Table 2 . Since our interest is in voting for the major parties, a rough guide was to include only those parties that attracted the support of 10 percent or more of the voters in the survey. xxiii In Japan, this presents few problems; the Communist Party did better in the SMDs than in the proportional district vote, but still failed to meet the 10 percent threshold. In total, those voting for other than the three major parties made up just 11 percent of the Japanese respondents. In Korea, the pattern is similar, and three major parties account for more than nine out of 10 respondents, with the centrist Our Party, the party of President Roh Moo-hyun, attracting 46 percent of the respondents who reported voting. In Taiwan, three parties meet the 10 percent threshold, making up 82 percent of the respondents' votes.
[ Table 2 about here]
In Australia, the two major parties xxiv attract 88 percent of the total vote, with the Greens attracting a further 8 percent. The Greens are included in the analyses although they fall just short of the 10 percent threshold because of their substantive importance in the political system.
In New Zealand, the three parties that attracted 10 percent or more of the vote-the Labour, National and New Zealand First parties-still leave about a quarter of the voters supporting minor parties. The fragmentation of the New Zealand party system began in the 1990s, brought on by a change in the electoral system from first past the post to a mixed member proportional system. respectively. A further problem is that no less than 41 percent of the respondent reported casting votes for candidates for whom party affiliation could not be ascertained. We also examine presidential vote for this reason.. More than eight out of 10 voters cast their ballot either for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who represented the K4 coalition, or Fernando Poe, representing the KNP coalition. However, the link between the two main presidential candidates and the parties was, on occasion, tenuous. In the case of Poe, the LDP split on his candidacy, and another party member, Panfilo Lacson, also ran. Thus, presidential vote is an imperfect proxy for party and is difficult to compare to the analyses of parliamentary vote in other nations.
Results

We begin our analyses by focusing on the two Western democracies of Australia and New
Zealand that lie at the edge of East Asia, but which should represent the broad patterns of cleavage alignments that we might find in Western democracies. With this benchmark set, we then turn to the other nations in our study. Table 3 about here]
The predominance of the owner-worker cleavage in Australian voting is shown in Table   3 Whatever the importance of other cleavages, socio-economic differences between voters were the predominant influences underlying Labour and National party support in the 2002 election (Table 4) . Like Australia, trade union membership was by far the most important predictor of the vote and was almost four times more important than the second most important predictor, income. Vestiges of the cleavages that dominated New Zealand politics early in the twentieth century, religion and urban-rural, are also evident in Table 4 . Socioeconomic divisions are less important in distinguishing Labour or National voters from voters for the populist New
Zealand First (NZF) party. Supporters of both major parties are more likely to have tertiary education compared to their NZF counterparts, and NZF voter are more likely to live in peripheral areas compared to National voters.
Japan. Studies of voting behavior in Japan have emphasized the absence of any major social cleavages in Japanese society to structure voting behavior. xxviii As a largely homogeneous society, Japan has not seen the religious, regional or ethnic divisions that have been so important in other societies. As a result, candidate-centered politics and the personal vote are important in shaping the vote, one consequence of the long period of LDP rule with no credible opposition.
Of the three parties included in Table 5 [ Table 5 about here]
These results underline the importance of religion in Japanese voting, through support from more committed Buddhists for the NKP. The results also confirm those of earlier studies which show the importance of the farm sector in support for the LDP. However, there are also significant effects for gender, age and education; indeed, age is the most important factor in the overall model. With the exception of center-periphery, voting patterns in Korea are notable for the weak influence of the four main social cleavages (Table 6 ). There is a modest impact for religion, with
Buddhists being more likely to support the Grand National Party over the other two parties. Both the GNP and the DLP are more likely to find their supporters in the Korean periphery, compared to Our Party, whose support is more likely to be found in and around Seoul. This supports other research on regional voting, which shows that GNP support is linked to powerful regional leaders outside of Seoul.
xxxi However, as in Japan, the strongest influences on Korean voting are associated with age, and to a lesser extent, gender. Older voters are more likely to support the GNP over the main alternatives; indeed, in both equations contrasting the GNP with the other two parties, age is as important as all the other independent variables combined. Women are also much more likely to support the GNP and Our Party, compared to the DLP.
[ Table 6 about here]
The Philippines. Previous research claims that voting in the Philippines is dominated by local patronage and machine politics, in line with many other developing countries. Corruption is often a major issue in national elections, and an additional factor has been the communist insurgency in the south of the country. As noted earlier, the analysis of voting in the 2001
Philippines elections is first based on the legislative elections, which contrasts the three parties forming the K-4 (Koalisyon ng Katapatan at Karanasan sa Kinabukasan or Coalition of Truth and Experience for Tomorrow). In addition, we examine the presidential election, which was a straight contest between the K-4 coalition and the opposition Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (Coalition of United Filipinos), or KNP.
The results for the legislative elections in Table 7 show that the only consistent predictor of legislative vote is center-periphery. Lakas and NPC supporters are more likely to come from the periphery, while Liberal Party supporters are more likely to be found in the National Capital Region, which includes Manila. There is a similar pattern in the presidential vote; Arroyo's supporters are in the outlying provinces, and Poe's in and around the capital. Indeed, in two of the four equations, center-periphery is by far the most important predictor of the vote. Urbanrural differences are important in distinguishing the K-4 parties, but have no effect on the presidential vote.
[Landscape Table 7 about here]
Focussing on patterns of voting in the 2001 presidential election, there are important patterns for education in Table 7 . The vote for Arroyo in 2001 was more likely to come from better-educated voters, especially those with tertiary education, while Poe's supporters were disproportionately found among the less educated. Indeed, the combined effect for education is almost equivalent to center-periphery in its impact on the vote. These effects do not appear in the contrasts between the K-4 parties; the only analogy is income, with Lakas supporters have significantly lower incomes compared to their NPC counterparts. It would appear, then, that
Arroyo support was associated with the traditional political elites, while Poe was a more populist candidate.
Taiwan. Voting behavior in Taiwan has been dominated by the issue of relations with
China, and for that reason social cleavages have generally exercised influence only in so far as they are related through, for example, provincial origins to political and national identity. [ Table 8 about here] Table 8 shows that the four potential social cleavages have relatively few effects on the vote. The center-periphery cleavage is significant in distinguishing KMT and DPP voters from PFP voters, with the latter being more likely to live in the areas in or around the capital, Taipei.
However, center-periphery considerations are unimportant in distinguishing voters across the main political divide, between the KMT and the DPP. Here the most important factors are age, with KMT voters being older than DPP voters, followed by education, with KMT voters being generally better educated. These results are similar to those reported by Chu for the [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] time period. xxxiv The stability of the effects suggests the continuing relevance of the independence issue, and the social factors to which it is related.
Conclusion
There are clearly systematic linkages between social structure and voting across the six countries [ Figure 1 about here]
The analyses tested the hypothesis that the Lipset-Rokkan paradigm can be used to explain social structure and voting in East Asia. At best, there is only weak support for the hypothesis, outside of Australia and New Zealand. While center-periphery and urban-rural differences are important in three of the four newer democracies, the other cleavages are not, with the partial exception of religion. Nor can it be argued that the four democracies are so different as to obviate any meaningful comparisons. While they differ in economic development and democratic experience, they all display a strong element of localism and personal patronage in their politics, xxxvi at least partly a function of their mixed-member systems electoral systems.
They also have exhibited strong, sometimes authoritarian state intervention to achieve economic goals, which in turn has stifled the development of civil society. xxxvii And their political elites have held a common belief that economic decline can lead to national disintegration, and as a consequence have been prepared to make short term compromises to achieve economic prosperity.
xxxviii One perhaps surprising finding is the absence of any significant owner-worker cleavage in party support outside of Australia or New Zealand. This is explained by the underdevelopment of the political left in three of the countries, the exception being Japan. In Korea and Taiwan, military rule and authoritarian governments have stultified the growth of the left, and the consequence mobilization of voters around the owner-worker cleavage. To the extent that the political left has attracted support, it has been on a policy platform broadly supportive of the prevailing policies of economic liberalization, rather than on traditional union issues of workers' rights. xxxix In many respects, the East Asian left is now similar in outlook to the new left in many of the established democracies.
The democratic experiences of the mass publics across the six countries has obviously had a major impact on their party support. Measuring that, of course, is extremely difficult, but
we can see elements of it in the consistent importance of age in the four newer democracies, and in the absence of it in the older democracies of Australia and New Zealand. There are clear generational influences at work as voters exhibit the political outlooks and views that were moulded by their political socialization in early adulthood. While it is beyond the scope of this study to examine these effects in depth, it would appear that the timing of the democratic transition and experiences associated with it are one of the strongest influences on the institutionalization of the party systems of East Asia. Philippines; and 2001 Taiwan. In Japan, the vote in the proportional district vote was used as the dependent variable, rather than the vote in the single member districts. Hong Kong was excluded because it is not a sovereign state and, in any event, created estimation problems since the number of voters was small (n = 357) and dispersed among 13 parties. Thailand could in principle be used in the analyses, but voting intention rather than past vote was collected, and this question elicited responses from just 21 percent of the respondents, representing a total useable N of just 150 of which the largest party had just 57 respondents.
The dataset included a sample weight for Japan and a demographic weight for the Philippines; in each case, the weighted number of respondents has been adjusted to the true number to leave significance tests unaffected. There were no weights for the other four countries. , 1987 -1997 (New York: Routledge, 2002 Party  ---------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Est (SE ---------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Est (SE 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
298) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
